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Summary  findings
Turkey and the European  Union (EU) have agreed to  equilibrium model of Turkey, they estimate that Turkey
implement a customs union. This means Turkey will  stands to gain between 1 and 1.5 percent of GDP
eliminate its tariffs and levies on imports of  annually from the customs union arrangement with the
manufactured products from the European Union.  EU, depending on what complementary policies it
Turkey will also apply the EU's "common external tariff"  adopts.
on imports from third countries. Turkey will be  They also estimate that lost tariff revenues will amount
obligated by 2001 to provide preferential  access  to its  to 1.4 percent of GDP. For Turkey to avoid worsening
markets to all countries to which the EU grants such  its fiscal deficit, it must find ways to reduce expenditures
access.  or increase revenues. Its best choice is to reduce
Since Turkey is both eliminating tariffs on EU imports  expenditures through accelerating privatization of state-
and reducing tariffs on imports from third countries, it  owned enterprises which will generate a number of
will become a rather  open economy in nonagricultural  macroeconomic and efficiency benefits in addition to the
sectors, with tariffs below 2 percent  (zero for imports  fiscal benefits.
from the EU and slightly over an average 3 percent for  If a value-added tax (VAT) is used as a replacement
third countries).  tax, they estimate that VAT rates must increase 16.2
And since preferential access agreements with third  percent  in each sector - for example, from 10 percent
countries will typically be reciprocal, Turkish exporters  to 11.6 percent - to compensate for the revenue losses
can expect improved access to those markets.  from implementing the full customs union. But uniform
According to Harrison, Rutherford,  and Tarr, Turkey's  application of the VAT would allow the VAT rates to fall
biggest gains from the customs union arrangement will  while still compensating for the loss from reduced tariffs
come from this improved access to third country  and would increase the welfare gain from the customs
markets. Using a comparative static computable general  union.
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I. Summary  and Overview
The Customs  Union with the EU contains  many elements,  and we have developed  a computable
general equilibrium  model to quantify  their impacts  on Turkish  welfare, employment  and value-added  by
sector, revenue implications  for the government,  real exchange  rate effects and other relevant  variables.
In this section  we provide  a broad overview  of those results and summarize  the main themes  that emerge
from the analysis.
It is well known that the customs union with the EU will imply that Turkey will eliminate its
tariffs and levies on imports  of manufacturing  products  originating  from the EU. In addition, Turkey  will
apply the "Common  External  Tariff" (CET) of the EU on imports from third countries. It may be less
understood that application  of the CET for most products will also involve a substantial reduction of
tariffs against  imports  from third countries. In part this is true because  the "most  favored nation" (MFN)
tariff of the EU is only about  7-8 percent  on average. But equally  important,  application  of the EU's CET
implies  that Turkey  will be obligated  to provide  preferential  access  to its markets  to all countries  to whom
'University of South Carolina, Colorado  University  and The World Bank, respectively.  The authors
would like to thank: Ismail  Arslan for his extensive  comments  and background  paper; Roberto  De Santis
and Gazi Ozhan for preparation  of the Social Accounting  Matrix; Subidey Togan for his background
paper and tariff calculations;  Jacob Kolster and Costas  Michalopoulos  of the World Bank, Olivier Bodin
and Bertin Martins of DGII and B. Hanbuckers  of DGI in the Commission  of the European Union, and
numerous individuals  in both the private sector and government  of Turkey for their helpful comments;
and Minerva Patefia for logistical support. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, the government  of Turkey, the European Union or those
acknowledged.
Ithe EU grants preferential access.'  By the year 2001, it is expected that Turkey will negotiate
preferential  trade agreements  with all countries  with whom the EU has a preferential agreement.  By the
year 2001, based on Turkey's present import shares, the average tariff on non-agricultural  imports  will
be less than 2 percent (zero for imports  from the EU and slightly  over 3 percent on average for third
countries).
Since Turkey is complementing  its tariff elimination  on EU imports with tariff reductions on
imports  from third countries,  Turkey  will become a rather open economy  in the non-agricultural  sectors.
This complementary  tariff reduction  to third countries  should  be regarded optimistically  since it reduces
the trade diversion  costs of the customs  union, and results in additional  gains  from trade. Moreover, since
the preferential  access agreements  with third countries  will typically  be negotiated  reciprocally,  Turkish
exporters can anticipate improved access to  the markets of the third countries to whom it grants
preferential  access. According  to our estimates,  improved  access  to third country  markets results in gains
to Turkey that are quantitatively  the most important  element in the customs union arrangements.  This
indicates that the government should expedite its negotiations  with all countries with whom it will
negotiate  preferential agreements,  analogous  to the steps it has already taken with Hungary.
Our estimates  are that the gains to Turkey of the customs union with the EU are between 1%-
1.5% of its GDP per year depending  on the complementary  policies adopted by Turkey, as discussed
below. These gains are recurring, in the sense that they can be expected  each year, and they take into
account  the costs of imposing  higher taxes to compensate  for the revenue loss of the tariff. Of course,
the results are dependent on the model structure. In particular, the long run dynamic impact on the
'This includes all the Eastern European  countries  with whom  the EU has "Association  agreements,"
the countries in the Mediterranean  that are subject to the EU's Mediterranean  policy, the African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries that are part of the Lome convention, as well as GSP treatment for
eligible countries.
2growth rate of the Turkish economy, however, is not estimated in our model, so the gains from the
customs union are likely to be larger than we have estimated. 2
At the same time, the movement  toward a more open economy  presents certain challenges  for
Turkish policy-makers.  One important  challenge  is the revenue replacement  challenge.  We estimate that
Turkey will lose tariff revenue equal to  1.4% of GDP. Given the crucial importance in Turkey of
reducing  the fiscal deficit, it is essential  that expenditure  reduction  or revenue  increases  be found so that
the customs union does not increase the fiscal deficit. If the VAT is used as the replacement  tax, we
estimate  that VAT rates will  have to increase  by 16.2%  in each sector to compensate  for the revenue loss
from implementing the full customs union (for example from  10% to  11.6%). This challenge is
complicated  by the fact that some tax experts  in the government  of Turkey  believe  that the most obvious
choice for a revenue  replacement  tax, the VAT, will generate  little revenue  due to tax evasion  problems.
There is a concern that an increase in the VAT  rates will increase  the relative  share of the informal sector
in the economy. To the extent that this is a valid concern, subsidy reductions  would serve the dual
2 'f  course, there are some caveats  to the estimates  due to the specific  model  structure  employed.  The
estimates  may be high to the extent that they ignore  the costs of adjustment.  There are likely to be short-
run costs of adjustment  to labor, including  temporary  unemployment,  even though  in the medium  to long
run there is no reason to believe the unemployment  rate would change. And Turkish industry  will have
to incur adjustment  costs in order to produce  at higher  product  quality standards. Estimates  of the costs
of adjustment,  however, are typically small in relation to the gains from trade liberalization.  (See Tarr
and Morkre, 1984.) Moreover, it is possible that some of the funds that the EU has allocated to assist
Turkey in its adjustment  to the customs  union could  be used for the purpose  of product quality  upgrading
in Turkish industries  as well in retraining  and relocating  labor. This would reduce the adjustment  costs
to Turkey. The estimates  also assume  that the preferential  access  agreements  with third countries  are all
implemented,  something  that will be phased in through 2001. Since the full gains will not be realized
before 2001, the estimates should  be viewed as a comparison  between 1993 and 2001 and subsequent
years. For years in between only a portion of the gains would be realized.
On the other hand, recent models  have shown that the dynamic  gains from trade liberalization
are several times the static gains. (See, Baldwin, 1989; and Rutherford and Tarr,  forthcoming.)
Incorporating  the impact of imperfect competition  would also increase the gains, although to a much
smaller extent than the dynamic  impacts. (See Harrison, Rutherford  and  Tarr, 1995.) Taking all these
caveats into account, the gains to Turkey are likely to be considerably  larger than we have estimated.
3purpose of increasing  efficiency  directly  by reducing  distortions,  but also would reduce  the revenue needs
of the state and reduce  the indirect  distortions  imposed  by subsidies  through  the requirement  of additional
taxes.
A second challenge  is how to use the trade and tax policies available  to Turkey after becoming
a member of the customs union so that significant  unintended distortions  are not introduced into the
economy.  For example,  the customs  union will not impose  any restrictions  on Turkey with respect to its
tariffs on agricultural  imports. Consequently,  agriculture  in Turkey  will become  highly  protected  relative
to manufacturing  unless Turkey takes unilateral action to reduce agricultural  protection. Similarly, the
customs  union imposes no restraints on export subsidies  to third countries  or in agricultural  products to
any destination. 3 Distortions  would  be created  regarding  the use of export subsidies,  unless proportional
reductions in  export subsidies are applied to third countries. In addition, the revenue replacement
requirements of implementing  the customs union will be significantly  reduced if export subsidies are
reduced in third country and agricultural  markets.  We estimate  that the VAT would have to increase by
only 9.1 % (rather than 16.2%) if export subsidy reduction to the rest of the world complemented
implementation  of the customs  union.
A third challenge  is to develop  a stable  macroeconomic  environment  that will encourage  foreign
direct investment.  Many  believe  that the creation  of a customs  union with the EU will encourage  foreign
direct investment  in Turkey, and that this will be one of the more important  benefits of the customs
3 Turkey is bound by GATTIWTO  rules, in addition  to any specific agreements  with the EU. Our
analysis  assumes (without investigation)  that Turkey is in compliance  with its GATT/WTO  obligations
with respect  to export incentives.  There are many  in Turkey  who  believe  that the Framework  Agreement
for the customs union between  the EU and Turkey imposes  comparable  restraints as GATT/WTO  rules
regarding  the subsidies  and export incentives  code. If that interpretation  is true, then our simulation  of
export subsidy  reduction  to the rest of the world should  be considered  as part of the gain of the customs
union, not as a policy option  for Turkey. Our interpretation,  however, is based on Articles  30-36 of the
Framework Agreement which relate to competition  policy within the customs union. These articles
restrain a wide range of actions  in the area of state aid and competition  policy and establish  measures  for
dispute resolution  which have the potential of being more binding  that GATTIWTO  commitments.
4union. For EU investors, the customs  union  may reduce  the risk of investing  in Turkey. For third country
investors, the improved access  to EU markets may also encourage  them to invest in Turkey.4 On the
other hand, the crisis in Mexico demonstrates that financial flows can flow out of Turkey if the
macroeconomic  situation  deteriorates.  This emphasizes  the need  to take actions  to reduce  the fiscal  deficit.
The customs union will result in Turkish industries  being exposed to international  competition
to a greater extent than has been the case to date. Thus, a fourth important  challenge is to develop
policies that will help Turkish industries become more competitive  in this increasingly competitive
environment.  World Bank experience  with industrial  strategy  (see Lieberman, 1990)  has shown that the
key ingredients to  a successful national industrial strategy are: creation of a stable macroeconomic
environment; development  of a competitive  markets, both for products and labor; and neutrality of
incentives  so that firms and entrepreneurs  realize that there is more to gain by effectively  competing  in
the market-place  as opposed  to lobbying  the government.
The solution  to all four of the above  challenges  point to the same set of policy options:  reduction
of state subsidies of various types and reduction of the role of the state in production. The need to
compensate  for the revenue loss from the tariff, given the limitations  of the other taxes, suggests  that it
is may be necessary  to find ways of reducing  state subsidies  to generate  revenue.  Subsidy  reduction  meets
efficiency  goals as well since it will allow  Turkey to avoid  unintended  new distortions  and optimize  its
entry into the customs union. To encourage foreign direct investment, a reduction in state aids will
provide  two benefits: by reducing  the fiscal deficit,  the rate of inflation  should  be reduced. The resulting
more stable macroeconomic  environment  should encourage foreign direct investment. In addition,
foreigners  will be more likely  to invest  if they are confident  that they  will receive  equal  treatment  relative
to Turkish firms. In particular, foreign investors will likely have much greater confidence in equal
'There is significant  competition  from similar economies  that have preferential access to the EU
market, such as Tunisia. This competition  would moderate  the increased  foreign direct investment.
5treatment if the sector has little or no state owned enterprises. Finally, an increasingly competitive
industrial structure brought on by the  customs union will further expose inefficient state  owned
enterprises. The loss-making  state owned  enterprises  will lose even more, making  it increasingly  costly
to maintain inefficient  SOEs. The drain on the state budget and the rest of the economy would likely
become even more of a constraint  on growth of the Turkish economy.
In summary, with participation with the EU in a customs union, Turkey now stands at an
historical crossroads. One road it can take at this time is the successful road taken by Spain after it
decided  to accede  to the EU (see box).  Spain  complemented  its accession  (and anticipated  accession)  to
the EU with a significant  reduction in the role of the state in the domestic  economy.
On the other hand, despite rapid growth  in the 1960s,  Greece has made much  less progress after
its accession  to the EU. Although  both Greece and Spain adopted  the external trade policies of the EU,
Greece continued to  support its  state owned enterprises to  a much greater degree. As  a result its
consolidated  fiscal deficit and public sector  borrowing  requirements  rose to a large share of GDP in the
1980s; this  crowded out private investment (which plunged) and contributed to  stagnant growth.
Moreover, even  the private sector is highly  regulated. Bureaucratic  control by state banks is one means
of applying  public influence  in the private sector; and the Greek industrial  structure is characterized  by
numnerous  cases of featherbedding  and subsidized  credit to feeble  producers. If, due to financial  problems,
a company  is taken over by a bank, it subsequently  obtains  a soft budget  constraint analogous  the state
enterprises in Eastern Europe of the 1980s.  (See Katseli, 1990; and Bliss and Macedo, 1990)
Between 1980  and 1992, Spain grew at over twice the rate of Greece. By 1992, among  the four
relatively poor members of the EU (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland), Spain had by far the highest
per capita income (at $14,000 it was about twice the level of Greece). 5
5See The World Bank, World Development  Report, 1994, table 1.
6Although  Turkey  in 1995  is a more open economy  than either Greece  or Spain at the start of their
accessions  to the EU, and the precise form of state intervention  in the domestic  economies  differed, all
three economies  experienced  the problem of excessive  state involvement  in their domestic  economies.  In
Turkey's  case, state  owned enterprises are its  analogous achilles heal.  The example of  Greece
demonstrates  that simply adopting  the external  trade policy of the EU will not be sufficient  to propel the
economy  forward to much higher growth rates. Bold and dramatic  action to reduce the role of the state
with respect  to subsidies  and ownership  of production  are crucial  for a fully effective  integration  with the
EU that will be capable  of significantly  boosting  the growth of the Turkish economy.
7SPAIN'S SUCCESSFUL  ACCESSION TO THE EU
After Franco's death in November  1975, Spain was confronted  with a mixed economy
that was administered  and controlled  by the state to a much  greater  extent than it was  free market.
Business  organizations  depended  on the state and the state bureaucracy  was a power of the first
order.
The industrial structure inherited  at this time was obsolete and remained isolated from
world markets. Under Franco's autarkical and dirigist objectives,  it was highly protected and
subsidized.
There were similar problems  in factor markets.  The labor markets  were extremely  rigid.
Interest rates were controlled  by the Ministry of Finance,  and Spain's dependence  on energy  was
among  the highest in Europe.
Although's Spain's industrial development  of the 1960s and early 1970s was capital
intensive, unemployment  did not increase owing to a tide of emigration  to the EU. After the
energy crisis it became  difficult  for Spanish  emigrants  to find work and many  returned to Spain.
This greatly augmented  unemployment  and social tensions.
Thus, at Franco's death, Spaniards  found  themselves  in an economic  crisis of enormous
proportions for which the Spanish  economy  was poorly equipped to react.  Starting from this
extremely  weak position,  after three decades  of economic  autarky  first and state intervention  and
regulation later, the new democratic  governments  elected after 1977 chose in a rational and
coherent manner  to integrate  with Europe, open  up the economy,  and reduce the role of the state
in the domestic  economy. While some other Western  European  governments  desired  to maintain
strong state intervention  to correct market failures, in Spain reduction of the role of the state in
the economy was regarded the only viable option to  release the economic potential of the
economy.  Thus, despite the Spanish left's traditional fears of capitalism, the Socialist and
Communist  parties voted unanimously  with all other parties to accede  to the EU and to declare
in the new constitution  that Spain is a market economy.
Despite  the fact that Spain  did not become a member  of the EU until 1986, liberalization,
both external and domestic,  began in earnest in 1977  due to anticipated  accession  to the EU. It
was not until 1986, however, that Spain actually became a member of the EU. Despite its
difficult starting position, Spain is regarded as the most successful  of the "Southern"  countries
in integrating  with Europe. On the negative  side, in the mid-1990s  Spain was struggling  with an
excessive  unemployment  problem.
Sources: Dehesa, 1991; Bliss and Macedo, 1990; Vinals, 1990; Blanchard  et al. (1995).
8II. Results for the Customs Union
We elaborate the principal elements of the Customs Union as we explain the results of our
simulations  in Table 1. First we explain  the variables  that make up the rows of tables 1 and 2.
W_AGG is the welfare gain to Turkey in billions  of 1990  Turkish lira, while  W  AGG% is the
welfare gain as a percent of GDP. In all of our experiments,  we have imposed  a constraint  that the fiscal
deficit  of the government  of Turkey cannot increase.  We implement  this constraint  by allowing  the VAT
rate to adjust in all sectors, such that the fiscal deficit is unchanged. The variable "TAU" shows the
amount  that the VAT must change. For example,  a value of 124.6 for TAU in the "TAR"  column,  means
the VAT rate must increase to 124.6% of its original level in all sectors, i.e., a 24.6% increase. We
examine  below the implications  of using other instruments  of taxation  or expenditure  reduction.
We report  results for the variable  PFX% which is the percentage  change  in the real exchange  rate
required to keep the balance of trade unchanged.  In general, reduction of tariffs induces  a depreciation
of the real exchange rate. This is because tariff reduction induces  an increase in imports, and a real
depreciation  is then required to increase exports and reduce imports such that the balance of trade is
unchanged.6
The percentage  change in the eight types of labor and the two types of capital in the model are
shown  by the variables labelled  L_PROF and so forth. The percentage  change in the value added of the
54 sectors in the model are shown for each scenario starting with "AGR" for agriculture and animal
husbandry  (see the appendix  for the specific definitions).
In the appendix we present the results of our systematic  sensitivity  analysis. While the overall
results for welfare, revenue implications  and real exchange  rate effects are quite robust, the results for
6This is a "real" model so there is no money  or financial  asset which is devalued.  The real exchange
rate is the relative price of tradeable  goods to non-tradeable  goods.
9specific  sectors in many  cases are very sensitive  to the choice of parameters.  In particular, there are some
cases where the "standard  deviation"  of the estimate exceeds  the point estimate; this means that some
sectors estimated  to expand  their value-added  might be estimated  to contract  with another  very plausible
specification  of model  elasticities.  Thus, this model  should  not be used for the purpose of picking  winners
and losers (nor should any other model in our view).
In the scenario labelled "ACCESS," we estimate the impact of improved access to the EU
markets. Turkey already has tariff free access to EU markets in manufactured  products, and agriculture
is for the most part excluded from the customs union agreement. However, Turkish exporters should
obtain improved access in textiles and apparel, steel and to a small extent in agriculture. After an
adjustmnent  period, Turkish exporters  will not be subject  to quantitative  restraints on textile and apparel
exports.' This should be especially  helpful  in the categories  of tee shirts and sweatshirts.  In steel, Turkish
exports  will not be subject  to the 6% import  tax, and there is some hope of a reduction  in other non-tariff
barriers that the EU applies  against  Turkish  exports. Finally,  although  agriculture  is essentially  out of the
agreement, it is expected  that some limited improved  access  to the EU markets will be obtained. Thus,
we have assumed that as a result of the Customs  Union, the price received  by Turkish exporters  to the
EU will increase  by: 5% in textiles; 15% in apparel; 10% in steel; and 1% in agricultural  products. We
find that the combined  affects of this improved  access  will increase  Turkish welfare by 0.  3 % of GDP.
In the scenario "STD" we simulate the impact of improved access to  EU markets due to
harmonization  of product quality standards and improvement  in testing laboratories in Turkey. It is
recognized  that additional  testing laboratories  are necessary  for Turkey,  and the pressure of increased  EU
competition  in import markets is likely to improve Turkish product quality and the price of Turkish
7 These restrictions derive from voluntary export restraints, and not from the MFA. Although a
transition period has been mentioned  in some negotiating  documents,  the current expectation  from both
sides is that there will in fact be no such transition  period. Our simulations  assume no transition.
10products in EU markets. In this scenario  we have assumed  that the price of Turkish exports will increase
by 1% in EU markets. This results in an increase in welfare of 0.1%.
In the scenario "TAR" we simulate  the impact of Turkey lowering its non-agricultural  tariffs
against the manufactured  products of the EU and implementing  the CET of the EU,  including the
preferential access agreements.  We take as our initial equilibrium  the situation that prevailed in 1993
(based on actual collections of tariffs, as opposed to  MFN rates). By  1993, Turkey has already
implemented  a large portion of the tariff changes  by phasing in the tariff changes over a 12 year or 22
year period, depending  on the product.  We take as our counterfactual  scenario,  the tariffs  that will prevail
in 2001,  after preferential agreements  have been negotiated with those countries that the EU has
preferential  agreements.'  This scenario  results in an improvement  of welfare equal  to 0.1% of GDP. The
benefits from this aspect of the customs union are perhaps smaller than some would anticipate. This
follows from a number of reasons: First, in our base year data, although  the EU was the major trading
partner of Turkey (43.6% of imports  and 48.3% of exports), the trade intensity  of Turkey was not very
high--imports  were 18.6% of GDP and exports were 14.6% of GDP. Thus, the total value of all EU
imports was only about 9% of GDP, and the tariff reductions induce 'triangles" of consumption
efficiency gains that are only a proportion of the value of the imports 9. Additional gains come from
8Tariffs  in the initial equilibrium  are based on actually  collected rates, and are taken from Arslan
(1995). Tariffs in the counterfactual  are taken from data provided by Professor Subidey Togan (see
appendix  for precise rates). These latter data are based on nominal tariffs expected  to prevail in 2001.
It is assumed  with these latter data that actual and nominal tariffs will be equal. Reasons  for differences
between  collected  and nominal rates of tariffs should  be significantly  reduced if not totally  eliminated  due
to  CU regulations. That is, there will be little scope for the investment  code and duty drawback
exemptions.
9In partial equilibrium,  the static consumption  deadweight  loss from an ad valorem tariff equal to t
is:
CDWL =  0.5 [t/(1 +t)] 2 e V
where e is the elasticity of demand, and V is the initial value of imports (see Morkre and Tarr, 1980,
chapter 2). That is, the gains from eliminating  tariffs are proportional  to the value of the imports,  where
11reductions in tariffs against the rest of the world (due to the common  external tariff of the EU, from
production  efficiency  gains as well, and from dynamic  gains from trade (we do not measure the latter);
but static efficiency  gains are dependent  on trade intensity.  Second, because tariff changes required by
the customs  union were phased in over time and already  significantly  implemented  in our benchmark  year
of 1993, there already was a low level of tariffs in Turkey in 1993. Thus, the reductions in the tariffs
induced  by the customs  union are not large typically.  As explained  in the previous  footnote,  welfare gains
from tariff reductions  increase more than proportionally  with the height of the initial tariff. Third, the
tariffs on agricultural  products are not reduced, so there are some non-uniformity  distortions  introduced
as the new tariff structure  strongly  favors agriculture.  Finally,  there are some trade diversion  costs in any
customs  union. The latter costs should not be high in Turkey's case since third country  tariffs will not
be high.
In the scenario "RECIP"  we simulate  the impact  of Turkey negotiating  reciprocal access to the
markets of third countries  with whom it will grant preferential  access  to its markets. That is, the EU has
negotiated  Association  Agreements  with a number  of countries, such as the central European  countries,
and Free Trade Agreements  with others such as Israel and Tunisia. Turkey is obligated  to negotiate
similar preferential trade agreements  with these countries  for non-agricultural  products. The impact of
Turkey reducing its tariffs against these countries is incorporated  in the scenario "TAR." But Turkey
that proportion  increases  with the elasticity  of demand  and increases  geometrically  with the initial value
of the tariff rate. For example,  if the elasticity  of demand  is unity and the tariff rate is 10% (t=0. 1), then
the consumption  deadweight  loss from elimination  of the tariff is 4/10 of one percent of the value of the
imports.  To illustrate the geometric  nature of the increase in the consumption  deadweight  loss with the
tariff rate, if t=0.2,  the deadweight  loss is 3.3 times greater, at 1.4% of the value of imports; if t=0.4,
the deadweight  loss is 9.9 times greater, at 4.1 % of the value of imports.
In our data, the weighted  average  tariff on non-agricultural  imports  is being  reduced  by about  7%,
and the value of all Turkish imports  is about  21.1  % of Turkish GDP. With a 7% tariff reduction in the
above formula, the gain is equal to about 2/10 of one percent of the value of imports. If the tariff
reduction  were applied on all imports  (including  agriculture),  with unitary elasticity  of demand, the gain
is small at 5/100 of one percent of GDP. The gains increase  proportionally  with the elasticities.
12should obtain improved access  to the markets of these countries, since the tariffs of these cantries will
be reduced against Turkish exports. We assume  that the improved access  for Turkish exports in third
markets will equal the improved  access that Turkey will offer third country imports. This implies that
improved access will increase the price Turkish exporters can obtain on exports to third countries  by
4.2%.10  Improved access to these markets results in a gain in Turkish welfare of 0.5%, which is the
largest gain of all the components."
In the scenario labelled "XSB" we simulate elimination of the remaining export incenives
program for exports of non-agricultural  products destined to  the EU only.' 2 Compared with more
general reduction of export subsidies  with respect to all countries (which appears  to be the more likely
policy choice), this does not affect Turkish welfare significantly  (there is a negligible reduction in
welfare).  The reason is that with removal of export subsidies only to the EU, exporters have the
incentive  to switch  export markets  away from the EU so they continue  to receive export  subsidies.  Thus,
the distortion  costs of the export  subsidy  program are not reduced  significantly,  unless  they are reduced
to all export markets. (More general reduction in export  subsidies  is discussed  below.)
In the scenario labelled "TRD" we simulate the impact of reduction in the costs of trading
between  the EU and Turkey. As a result of the customs  union, closer relations with the EU will likely
bring with it a possible reduction in costs of clearing goods at the frontier. This is an effect similar to
that of the single market  program of the EU. In the case of the EU this effect was assumed  to reduce the
"The difference  between  the EU's most favored  nation  CET and Turkey's third country  tariff  tking
into account  preferences  (and  weighted  by Turkey's  trade weights)  is 4.2%. This may  be an underestimate
of the improved access Turkey wil  receive in third markets since Turkish external  tariffs  under  the
common external tariff of the EU are lower on average than the MFN rates of developing countries
receiving  preferential access  to the EU.
"Improved  access,  by improving  the  prices received  by Turkish  exporters,  results in both 'rectangles'
of gains on all previous sales in these export markets,  plus triangles of gains on new sales.
" 2The  rate of export subsidies  by sector is taken  from Arslan (1995); see the appendix  for the precise
rates per sector.
13costs of trading  by 1  .5%-2%  The impact  should  be quantitatively  less important  for Turkey  so we assume
that there will be a 0.3 % reduction  in the costs  of goods  imported  from the EU and the costs of exporting
to the EU will also decline  by 0.3%. This results in an improvement  in Turkish welfare of 0.1%.
In the scenario "FULL" we combine all of the above elements. The overall gain in Turkish
welfare is equal to 1.1  % of GDP. These are annual  gains in the sense that they can be expected  to recur
each year. Since our model is a static model, we ignore the dynamic  gains from trade which would be
expected  to increase the benefits of trade liberalization,  i.e., produce  larger benefits.
The variable TAU shows  that it will be necessary  to increase  the rate of VAT taxation  by 16.2%
in order to keep  the fiscal deficit  unchanged.  This is a proportional  increase in the rate of VAT for each
sector, starting from the initial collected  VAT rates. The variable PFX% shows that the real exchange
rate must depreciate by 0.5% in order to hold the balance of trade constant. This is a modest real
depreciation  and reflects a number of considerations:  (1) the tariff change  is not large; (2) there is some
limited improved  access  to the markets of the EU, which has the effect of appreciating  the real exchange
rate; and (3) improved  access  to the markets  of third countries  under reciprocal  free  trade agreements  will
also appreciate  the real exchange  rate."3
III. Revenue Replacement
Given the importance  of the fiscal deficit in Turkey, it is important  that steps are taken to avoid
an increase in the fiscal deficit as a result of the tariff reductions  engendered  by the customs union. We
estimate  that Turkey will lose about 1.4% of GDP from tariff reductions,  although  Turkish government
revenue will increase by 0.3% from reduction  in export subsidies  to the EU.
'Of course, since there is no money  in the model, we are not referring to the nominal  exchange  rate.
If Turkish inflation continues, significant nominal depreciation  would be required to  keep the real
exchange  rate from appreciating.
14In our principal  scenarios  we have used a VAT  as the means  of generating  government  revenue.
Taking into account general equilibrium  effects, we have found  that VAT rates will have to increase by
16.2% in order to compensate  for the revenue loss of the tariff. More generally, we would expect that
improving  collection  rates in the VAT which would make it more uniform, should reduce the economic
distortions  of the VAT as well as increase  its revenue  potential;  that would allow  lowering  of the average
VAT rate.' 4
There are, however, other mechanisms  available. We have estimated the gains (or losses) to
Turkey of implementing  the customs  union while using other taxes as the "replacement"  tax. In all cases
we consider  the scenario FULL, and ask what is the scaler multiple of the existing  tax that would be
required such that the fiscal deficit  would not be increased.
One alternate  replacement  tax that we have evaluated  is a broad based uniform  consumption  tax.
We have  found that the welfare increase  from the customs  union, with a uniform  consumption  tax is 1.0%
of GDP, only a 0.1 % reduction  relative to the use of the VAT as the replacement  tax. Given its uniform
nature, the consumption  tax is almost as efficient as the VAT.
Another tax which has received limited  discussion  in Turkey is a special consumption  tax on a
limited  range of products:  notably, autos, fuels, alcohol  and tobacco  products. The  problem  with a special
consumption  tax is that by imposing  a tax on only a limited range of products, the tax base is narrow.
Then considerable  distortions  are created, since  the rate of taxation  on these specific products must be
very high to generate  adequate  revenue  which induces  resources  to move out of the highly  taxed sectors.
" 4A similar conclusion  was drawn in the report by Krueger et al. (1995, pp. 61, 62). They estimated
that Turkey  will lose 3.52% of its GDP as a result of tariff and special fund reduction,  but that increases
in the VAT rate and alignment  of the VAT across all sectors  as in the EU will result in compensation  of
revenue loss from the tariff. Their report (p. 62) notes:
insofar as tariffs are removed and no measures  are taken to increase VAT revenues, entry into
the customs union will be marked by a fall in government  revenues. If, however, the Turkish
authorities  take  advantage  of the  opportunity  to  align  VAT  rates  and  maintain or  increase
collection rates  [emphasis added], the revenue consequences of entry should be positive.
15In  fact,  with plausible elasticities a  narrow consumption  tax is  not a  feasible option for
replacement of revenue. That is, the tax base is too small to generate adequate  income to replace the
revenue  lost. The higher  tax discourages  consumption  of the product, and thus cannot  generate  unlimited
revenue. The value of Turkish income  spent on these  commodities  is simply  not large enough  to generate
the required revenue, given normal assumptions  about  elasticities.' 5
In summary, the government  will need to factor into its fiscal  program  possible  revenue shortfall
arising  from implementation  of the customs  union. We show below, that uniform  taxation  aggressively
enforced is the best way to proceed  with goods  market taxation.  If the VAT could  be applied  uniformly,
welfare would  be increased  and the rate of VAT  could  be reduced  without  reducing  revenues.  In addition,
as mentioned above, subsidy reduction and the reduction of the role of the state in production are
important  elements  in reducing  the need for taxation  and help to relieve fiscal pressures.
IV. Additional  Unilateral  Measures
The changes required by the customs union may in some cases introduce distortions in the
incentive  structure in Turkey that are unintended  by the government. In this section we examine the
consequences  of Turkey taking additional  unilateral  steps that are not required by the EU to implement
the customs  union that will allow  Turkey  to make a more effective  and efficient  transition  to the customs
union.
Reduction  in Agricultural  Tariffs
Since agricultural tariff changes are not required by the customs union agreement, without
unilateral  policy action  by the Turkish government  the level of agricultural  tariff protection  will increase
substantially  relative to manufacturing.  That is, the customs  union requires  the imposition  of zero tariffs
" 5In fact, some discussion of the special consumption  tax indicates  that it is not intended as a
replacement  tax for lost revenues from the customs  union. Rather several taxes in the named sectors
would simply  be aggregated  into a single  tax in each sector  for the purpose of tax reform or simplicity.
16on manufacturing  products from the EU and the EU's CET oin  third country imports of these same
products, while no changes  in agricultural  protection  are required. Without further unilateral measures
on the part of Turkey beyond the customs union, the relative protection of agriculture will increase
substantially.  In the scenario  labelled  "AGLIB,"  we simulate  the impact  of Turkey lowering  its tariffs on
agricultural imports from all regions by 50 percent, in addition to the changes  entailed in the customs
union. This results in some improvement  in Turkish welfare as measured in Turkish lira (relative to
"FULL"), but the percentage  impact  on GDP is small. The reason for the small gains from the marginal
reduction in agricultural tariffs is that export subsidies in agriculture remain to all destinations. The
reduction  in import  tariffs in agriculture  reduces  the incentive  to produce  in the domestic  market relative
to exports. The increase in exports, induced  by the tariff reductions, is an inefficient  increase due to the
export  subsidies,  and results in only  very small  gains from this piecemeal  policy  change. What  is required
for more significant  gains is simultaneous  removal  or reduction of both the import tariff and the export
subsidy. 6
Removal  of Export Subsidies  to Third Countries
Even though the customs union might only require elimination  of export subsidies  on exports
going to the EU on non-agricultural  products, considerable  additional  efficiency  gains would accrue to
Turkey  if export subsidies  were eliminated  more  widely.  This is because  if export subsidies  are eliminated
on EU exports and not on exports  to the rest of the world, exporters  will divert exports to the rest of the
world where the export subsidies  remain. The diversion  of exports substantially  reduces the efficiency
gains from discriminatory  export subsidy reduction. Consequently,  it is only with non-discriminatory
elimination of export subsidies that we observe a welfare increase from the elimination of export
'6Morkre and Tarr (1995)  have shown  that the welfare  impact  of piecemeal  tariff reduction in a sector
with an export subsidy  is equal to a triangle of gain in reduced import distortions  less the rectangle of
increased  export subsidies.  They show, also using  a general  equilibrium  model, that simultaneous  removal
of the import tariff and the export subsidy  yields much larger benefits.
17subsidies. We therefore simulate the elimination  of export subsidies  on a non-discriminatory  basis in
addition to all the changes  entailed  in the customs  union; this scenario  is labelled "XSBO."  It results in
a gain in welfare equal to 1.2% of GDP, or an increase in 0.1% of GDP relative to the gains derived
from implementation  of the "FULL" customs  union without  additional  action on export  subsidy  reduction
to the rest of the world. The marginal  0.1 % of GDP improvement  is comparable  to the gains received
from discriminatory  tariff reduction  discussed  above, and reflects the fact that the exports to GDP ratio
of Turkey (14.6%) is not high in our base data.
The revenue  impact  of this scenario  is also quite  important,  and we observe  that the variable  TAU
increases by only 9.1 % in XSBO,  compared  to an increase  of 16.2% in FULL. This means  that due to
the reduction in expenditures  on export subsidies  there is less of a need to raise revenues through an
increase in the VAT. To the extent that there are limitations  on the ability of the VAT to effectively
collect revenues, this advantage  of reducing  export subsidies  generally in parallel with implementation
of the customs union could be crucial to avoid damaging  fiscal  deficits.
Removal of all Subsidies  and Taxes except the VAT
In the scenario labelled "SECOND"  we eliminate  all tariffs, subsidies  and taxes present in the
base model  except for the VAT, and allow  the VAT in each sector  to adjust  proportionally  to compensate
for any changes in the fiscal deficit. These  changes are implemented  in addition to the changes  that are
part of the customs  union. We observe that welfare increases  by 1.4% of GDP (or 0.3% more than in
the case of implementation  of the customs union alone), but the rate of VAT taxation must increase by
74% in order for the fiscal deficit to remain unchanged.
Many  subsidies  that apply  to specific  industries  do not appear  in the 1990  input-output  table. With
improved data and measurement  of these distortions,  the estimated  benefits of wider subsidy  reduction
would likely be larger.
18In the scenario labelled "FIRST"  we implement  the same elimination  of all distortions  and use
only a uniform VAT as the replacement  tax. Welfare increases  by 1.5% of GDP. Interestingly,  the rate
of VAT that would apply  for all sectors is only 12.8 percent. This rate of VAT is lower than the legal
rate in most sectors. The reason that a low rate of VAT can coexist  with the reduction of all taxes and
subsidies  is that it is applied uniformly; this means that in this scenario we assume that we eliminate
exemptions  and well as different rates of collection across sectors. (Other things equal, the scenario
"SECOND"  shows that the VAT must increase by 74% of its base rate in each sector if exemptions  and
evasions  are not reduced.)  Implementation  of a uniform  rate across  all sectors may be difficult  to achieve
in reality, but if it can be implemented,  the scenario  shows  that considerable  reduction  in the rate of VAT
taxation  can be achieved.
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22Table  1:  Impact of the Customs Union with the European Union on Turkey:
Full and Decomposed Effects
ACCESS  STD  TAR  RECIP  XSB  FULL  TRD
W  AGG  904.3  272.9  286.4  1203.0  -75.4  2861.3  182.0
W.AGG%  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.5  1.1  0.1
TWU%  98.7  99.4  124.6  97.7  97.6  116.2  99.8
PFX%  -3.0  -0.5  3.0  -1.8  1.4  0.5  -0.1
L  PROF  1.1  0.1  -0.6  0.4  -0.5  0.4  0.1
L  ADMN  1.7  0.2  -0.7  0.6  -0.8  0.4  0.1
LTCLER  0.7  0.1  -0.4  0.5  -0.2  0.7  0.1
L  RETL  0.1  0.1  -0.4  0.5  0.4  0.9  0.1
L SRVC  0.5  0.1  -0.5  0.4  0.6  0.1
L  AGRC  -0.4  0.1  0.6  0.4  0.4  1.4
L  PROD  1.3  0.2  -0.9  0.7  -0.7  0.3  0.1
L  OTHR  1.5  0.2  -1.0  0.5  -0.8  0.1
K HOM  1.7  0.2  -0.5  0.5  -0.8  0.6  0.1
K AGRC  -0.4  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.4  1.2
AGR  0.1  0.1
FRS  -1.4  -0.1  -0.6  -0.4  0.6  -1.2  -0.1
FIS  0.1  -1.0  -0.2  0.1  -0.9
COL  -0.9  -0.1  -0.6  0.5  0.6  -0.1
CRU  -0.2  -1.4  0.3  -1.0
MIN  -4.5  -0.6  0.8  2.5  2.2  2.3  -0.2
STO  -0.5  0.2  -0.2
MEA  3.8  0.1  1.5  -0.1  -1.4  2.2
CAN  -25.6  1.7  45.3  -4.9  27.1  47.7  0.5
VEG  -4.2  -0.4  1.6  1.7  2.2  2.7  -0.1
GRN  -1.6  -0.4  0.3  1.0  0.2
SUG  -1.5  -0.1  -0.7  -0.2  1.0  -0.8  -0.1
OFP  -2.2  0.1  0.9  0.1  1.5  1.6
ALC  -5.8  -9.3  1.1  2.8  -8.3
BEV  -3.0  -4.5  0.8  2.3  -3.2
TOB  -1.4  -6.6  0.7  1.4  -4.9
TXT  11.7  0.6  6.6  -2.5  -10.0  2.2  0.2
WAP  57.9  1.1  9.4  -3.5  -19.1  18.6  0.3
LEA  22.3  0.3  8.1  -1.8  -11.4  6.9
SHO  -2.1  -0.1  -0.5  0.8  0.3  -0.6
WOO  -0.8  -0.8  0.1  0.4  -0.9
FRN  -1.1  -0.8  0.2  0.5  -0.7
PAP  -2.1  -0.1  -2.1  0.2  1.0  -2.3
PRN  -0.9  0.1  -1.5  0.5  0.8  -0.3
FRT  -2.4  -0.2  4.0  -0.3  -0.7  1.5
DRG  -3.3  -0.3  0.6  0.5  1.7  0.5  -0.1
OCP  -3.8  -0.2  -0.7  0.4  -0.1  -2.5  -0.1
REF  -0.2  0.1  -2.6  0.4  0.1  -1.7
PET  -0.9  -0.9  0.4  0.4  -0.4
RBR  -1.3  -0.1  -0.8  0.2  0.4  -0.9
PLA  -1.6  0.1  0.8  0.6  0.7  1.2  0.1
GLA  -5.1  2.2  0.6  -0.8  -1.0
CEM  -0.5  0.1  0.2
NMM  -2.0  -0.1  -3.7  -0.3  0.2  -5.0  -0.1
IRO  -4.3  -0.6  0.6  3.4  2.1  3.0  -0.2
NFM  -3.4  -0.1  -0.5  1.2  -1.6  -2.6
FAB  -1.6  -1.5  0.7  0.4  -1.3
MAC  -1.2  -0.1  0.4  0.5  0.1  0.4
AGM  -0.3  -0.5  0.1  -0.5
ELM  -2.6  -2.0  0.2  -1.4  -4.3
SHP  -5.5  -0.5  4.2  1.6  0.9  2.8  -0.1
RRE  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.2  -0.2
VEH  -2.8  -0.2  -13.0  -0.2  1.5  -13.2  -0.1
OTE  -2.2  -0.2  0.3  -0.7  0.3  -1.4  -0.1
OMN  0.3  0.3  -3.4  1.5  -0.2  -1.3  0.2
ELE  -0.1  0.2  -0.3  -0.1
GAS  -0.5  0.1  0.3  0.1
CON  0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1
TRD  -1.0  -0.1  -0.2  0.8  -0.1
RES  -4.3  -0.1  0.9  0.3  2.6  1.1
TRN  -0.5  0.2  0.3  0.3
COM  -0.6  -1.6  0.2  0.7  -1.0
FIN  0.1  0.1  0.1
SRV  -0.6  -0.1  -0.1  0.3  -0.3
Source: Model  Estimates
23Table  2:  Impact of Unilateral Turkish Policy Choices
to Optimize Customs Union Implementation
FULL  AGLIB  XSB0  SECOND  FIRST
W AGG  2861.3  2958.7  3246.6  3639.7  4027.7
W AGG%  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.4  1.5
TAU%  116.2  118.4  109.1  174.9  12.8
PFX%  0.5  0.8  2.8  2.3  4.2
L_PROF  0.4  0.4  0.7  -4.2  -3.9
LJADMN  0.4  0.5  -0.2  -7.6  -4.7
L CLER  0.7  0.7  1.0  -5.2  -4.3
L RETL  0.9  1.0  2.5  -6.2  -5.4
L-SRVC  0.6  0.6  1.4  -4.9  -5.1
LJAGRC  1.4  1.4  0.8  -3.9  -13.5
LPROD  0.3  0.4  -0.6  -8.7  -4.6
LOTHR  0.1  -0.5  -7.4  -4.6
K HOM  0.6  0.7  0.6  -6.3  -4.6
KCAGRC  1.2  1.2  0.7  -3.8  -12.4
AGR  0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.4
FRS  -1.2  -1.3  -0.4  3.5  0.9
FIS  -0.9  -0.9  -0.3  4.8  4.4
COL  -0.1  -0.2  -2.1  -3.3  -2.4
CRU  -1.0  -1.2  -1.5  -3.6  2.4
MIN  2.3  2.2  -11.0  -12.2  -7.7
STO  -0.2  -0.2  -0.5  -0.3  -0.3
MEA  2.2  3.6  -1.5  5.8  0.3
CAN  47.7  57.0  -26.1  -17.0  -18.8
VEG  2.7  3.1  -2.0  4.7  -4.0
GRN  0.2  0.5  0.9  3.6  2.1
SUG  -0.8  -2.2  0.8  -18.5  -17.1
OFP  1.6  3.1  2.2  8.8  3.4
ALC  -8.3  -9.0  -4.9  -51.1  -25.1
BEV  -3.2  -3.1  -3.3  -7.8  16.8
TOB  -4.9  -5.5  -2.7  -52.5  -29.5
TXT  2.2  2.7  4.0  14.9  9.1
WAP  18.6  19.8  20.7  45.3  28.0
LEA  6.9  8.2  3.3  18.9  6.7
SHO  -0.6  -0.6  -2.5  1.0  -4.2
WOO  -0.9  -1.0  -0.9  1.5  -1.8
FRN  -0.7  -0.9  -0.6  1.4  -0.4
PAP  -2.3  -2.4  -3.7  -5.3  -2.6
PRN  -0.3  -0.8  0.4  -1.9  11.5
FRT  1.5  1.6  -2.0  -3.3  -4.2
DRG  0.5  0.3  -0.5  5.9  -4.8
OCP  -2.5  -2.6  -6.7  -5.2  -7.9
REF  -1.7  -1.9  -2.2  -7.3  2.9
PET  -0.4  -0.5  -0.3  -3.1  -1.4
RBR  -0.9  -1.0  -1.1  0.8  -2.3
PLA  1.2  1.2  -1.2  0.3  0.8
GLA  -1.0  -1.1  -4.8  -1.8  -7.1
CEM  -0.3  -1.0  -0.2
NMM  -5.0  -5.1  -4.6  -4.7  -3.9
IRO  3.0  2.9  -12.8  -14.3  -9.4
NFM  -2.6  -2.8  -8.8  -10.4  -0.7
FAB  -1.3  -1.4  -3.1  -0.9  -2.9
MAC  0.4  0.3  -1.3  -0.4  -1.8
AGM  -0.5  -0.5  -0.7  -1.5  -0.6
ELM  -4.3  -4.5  -5.6  -6.8  0.6
SHP  2.8  2.9  -2.3  1.2  -3.1
RRE  -0.2  -0.2  -0.5  -0.4
VEH  -13.2  -13.5  -11.4  -19.2  8.7
OTE  -1.4  -1.4  -0.5  -2.2  3.9
OMN  -1.3  -1.8  -1.5  -6.7  19.2
ELE  -0.1  -0.1  -1.4  -1.4  0.3
GAS  0.1  0.1  0.5  2.2  -1.2
CON  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.9  0.3
TRD  -0.1  -0.2  0.9  -1.0  -2.3
RES  1.1  1.4  4.4  6.5  5.4
TRN  0.3  0.3  0.7  1.0
COM  -1.0  -1.3  -1.9  8.9
FIN  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.4  0.7
SRV  -0.3  -0.3  0.2  2.4  0.5
Source: Model  Estimates
24Appendix:  Model  Documentation
1. General  Model Structure
Our Small Open Economy  (SOE)  model  is designed  for trade policy analysis  with a large
number of sectors. The model is a "generic" general equilibrium  model of a single economy
along  the lines of  de  Melo and Tarr  [1992], Harrison, Rutherford and  Tarr  [1993] and
Rutherford, Rutstr6m  and Tarr [1994].  We describe here the general  features of the base model,
adding details about the 1990  version for Turkey later.
Goods are produced using primary factors and intermediate inputs. Primary factors
include eight types of labor and five types  of capital.' It is common  to assume in the "short run"
that factors are likely to be sector-specific,  and in the "long-run"  that factors  tend to be mobile
across sectors. We would  expect a short run model  of his kind to generate  smaller welfare gains
from liberalization, since resources are  constrained in  their ability to  reallocate to  more
productive  uses. On the other hand, we would  expect the short run model  to exhibit  less extreme
changes  in production  structure  since the sector-specificity  of factors  generates  less elastic  supply
schedules.  We also recognize  that some factors are likely to be specific to one or other sectors
even in the long run. An obvious example might be the natural resources used in mining.
Production  exhibits constant returns to scale and individual  firms behave competitively,
selecting output levels such that marginal cost at those output levels equals the given market
price. Output is differentiated  between goods destined for the domestic and export markets.
Exports  are further distinguished  according  to whether they  are destined for the EU or the Rest
The specific types are discussed  below.
A-1Of the World (ROW). This relationship is characterized  by a two-level constant elasticity of
transformation frontier. Composite output is an aggregate of domestic output and composite
exports; composite  exports are aggregates  of exports for the EU and ROW markets.
Final demand by private households  arises from nested constant  elasticity  of substitution
(CES) utility functions.  This allows consumer decision-making  to occur in the form of multi-
stage budgeting. At the top level goods from different sectors compete subject to the budget
constraint of  the consumer, and all income elasticities are  unity. In  the second stage the
consumer  decides how much to spend on domestic  or imported  goods in each sector, subject to
income allocated  to spending  in that sector in the first stage. Finally, having  decided how much
to spend on  imports as a whole, the consumer allocates this expenditure  on  EU and ROW
imports. Each allocation  decision is modelled  as a CES function.
The model  allows tariff rates to differ depending  on whether  the imports  are from the EU
or the ROW. Exports  can be sold at different  prices depending  on whether they are destined for
EU or ROW markets. The same is possible  on the import side. These distinctions  allow us to
study policy options from Turkey's trade negotiations  with the EU that result in improved
market access for Turkish exporters or for EU exporters  to Turkey.
Government  expenditures  and investment  demand  are exogenous.  Funding  of government
expenditures is  provided by  tax  revenues and tariff revenues. In  addition to  tariffs, the
government  also derives income from indirect taxes (net of subsidies). These are modelled  as
Value Added Taxes (VAT).
We also allow for a special tax to be levied on the consumption  of a specified set of
consumer  goods. In early debates  over the need to replace  lost revenues, this consumer  tax was
A-2proposed by the Turkish authorities as the device to be used to ensure that there is no net
revenue impact  from the CU. Since the expectation  is that tariff revenues will decline, all other
things being equal we would  expect this tax to have to be positive to ensure revenue neutrality.
Our model  solves  explicitly  for the level of this tax required for this to be so, taking into account
changes in "all other things".
Since private consumption  equals the income from primary factors plus net transfers to
the consumer by the government (from domestic and foreign trade taxes), Walras law  is
satisfied. Public consumption  is balanced with revenue.
World market import and export prices are fixed, so there are no endogenous  changes
in the terms of trade. In other words, import  supplies  and export demands  are infinitely  elastic
at given world prices. The current account  balances  the value of exports and imports  taking into
account exogenously-fixed  capital inflows. Our model allows for changes in these fixed world
prices,  such as  might be expected to  occur after the Uruguay Round reforms have been
implemented  (see Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1995]).
2. Empirical  Implementation  for Turkey
We employ a 1990 Social Accounting  Matrix (SAM) for Turkey, due to De Santis and
Ozhan [1994], which distinguishes  54 production sectors, 8 types of labor, 5 types of capital,
and 40 households differentiated by rural or urban residence and income level. This SAM
provides a consistent  set of relationships  showing intermediate,  final demand, value added and
foreign transactions.
A-3We also employ some  ancillary  data on production  subsidies  from the 1990 Input-Output
(IO)  table provided  by the State Institute  of Statistics  [19941.2  Import  tariffs and export subsidies
are calibrated to collected  rates in 1993, the most recent year for which  we have consistent  data.
We also use estimates  of collected  VAT rates for 1990.
Table Al lists the names of our 54 production  sectors, along with a 3-letter  acronym  that
we will use throughout. This level of disaggregation  provides excellent  detail on the effects of
tax and subsidy distortions, although there is some aggregation  in the area of transportation
sectors (TRN) which would be useful to have given the level and variation of SOE activity. 3
Table A2 lists the names of the primary factors of production identified in the SAM,
along with the acronym to  be used for each. Some of the occupational  distinctions (e.g.,
L_PROF  and L_ADMN)  are likely to be important  for understanding  the impacts  of reforms on
the distribution  of welfare across household  types to the extent that we expect some correlation
between household income levels and occupation. In Table A2b, we list the percent of value-
added in the sector that is accounted  for by the specific  labor type. If we sum across a row in
Table A2a, we have the percent of value-added  due to all labor types. The decomposition  of
labor's share into labor type is derived from De Santis  and Ozhan (1994, Table B8). In addition
to the Household Labor Force Survey, De Santis and Ozhan used the Census of Population
(which  provides data on the population  according  to economic  activity  and occupation),  and the
2 The SAM only report net indirect taxes, whereas the IO table breaks out production  subsidies  and indirect
taxes by sector.
I This aggregation  is relative to the 64 sectors  available  in the 10 table. The IO sectors are Railway  Transport
(#56), Other Land Transport (#57),  Water Transport  (#58) and Air Transport  (#59). By far the largest of these in
terms of value added in 1990  was Other Land Transport,  with  a Gross  Value Added (at purchasers  prices)  of 42.5
billion TKL. Water Transport is next largest, with a value added of only 3.4 billion TKL. On the other hand,
Railway  Transport  receives  the largest direct production  subsidy  of 331  million  TKL on a value added of only 457
million  TKL.
A-4Table Al:  Production  Sectors
AGR  Agriculture  and animal  husbandry
FRS  Forestry
FIS  Fisheries
COL  Coal  mining
CRU  Crude  petroleum  and  natural  gas  production
MIN  Iron  ore  mining
STO  Non-ferrous  ore  &  non-metallic  mineral  mining  & stone  quarrying
MEA  Slaughtering  preparing  & preparing  &  preserving  meat
CAN  Canning  and  preserving  of fruits  and  vegetables
VEG  Manufacture  of vegetable  and  animal  oils  and  fats
GRN  Grain  mill  products
SUG  Sugar
OFP  Manufacture  of other  food  products
ALC  Alcoholic  beverages
BEV  Soft  drinks  and  carbonated  water  industries
TOB  Tobacco  manufactures
TXT  Textiles  (inc.  ginning)
WAP  Wearing  apparel
LEA  Leather  and fur  products
SHO  Footwear
WOO  Wood  and  wood  products
FRN  Furniture  and  fixtures
PAP  Paper  and  paper  products
PRN  Printing  & publishing  &  paper  products
FRT  Fertilizers
DRG  Drugs  and  medicine
OCP  Other  chemical  products
REF  Petroleun  refineries
PET  Petroleum  and  coal  products
RBR  Rubber  products
PLA  Plastic  products
GLA  Glass  and  glass  products
CEM  Cement
NMM  Non-metallic  mineral  products
IRO  Iron  and  steel
NFM  Non-ferrous  metal
FAB  Fabricated  metal  products
MAC  Machinery  except  electrical
AGM  Agricultural  machinery  and  equipment
ELM  Electrical  machinery
SHP  Shipbuilding  and  repairing
RRE  Railroad  equipment
VEH  Land  transport  vehicles  and equipment
OTE  Other  transport  equipment
OMN  Other  manufacturing  industries
ELE  Electricity
GAS  Gas  manufacture  and  waterworks
CON  Building  construction  and  other  construction
TRD  Wholesale  and retail  trade
RES  Restaurants  and  hotels
TRN  Railway  transport  & other  land  & water  & air  transport
COM  Communications
FIN  Financial  institutions  and  insurance
SRV  Private  &  public  services  & ownership  of dwellings
A-5Table A2: Factors of Production
Labor  Types
L PROF  Scientific,  technical,  professional  and  related  workers.
LADMN  Administrative,  executive  and  managerial  workers.
LCLER  CLerical  and related  workers.
LRETL  Sales  workers.
LSRVC  Service  workers.
L  AGRC  Agricultural,  animal  husbandry  and forestry  workers,  fisherman  and hunters.
L  PROD  Non-agricultural  production  &  related  workers,  transport  equipment  operators  & laborers.
L  OTHR  Workers  not classifiable  by occupation.
Capital  Types
K  RENT  Rent.
K_AGRC  Operating  surplus  in agriculture.
K  PROD  Operating  surplus  in non-agriculture.
K_TRAD  Operating  surplus  in  trade.
K  SERV  Operating  surplus  in  services.
Manufacturing  Industry Statistics  which indicates  the number of people in each manufacturing
activity.
In Table A2b, we list the percent of value-added  by capital type.  Some of these types
are not very useful for our purposes, since they largely identify factors that are specific to
certain  groups  of sectors. Thus, we aggregate  K_RENT,  K_PROD,  K_TRAD  and K_SERV  into
one homogeneous  capital factor which can move across sectors. The factor K_AGRC  is free to
move across the agricultural sectors in which it is used in the base year, but not to any other
sectors.
Some explanation may be required for the fact that the Turkish input-output table
classifies 91 percent of value-added  in agriculture to capital. The reason is that the returns to
individuals  who operate their own farms are classfied in the Turkish input-output table as a
return to the owner as a capitalist, rather than to the owner as a worker. We chose not to alter
the input-output  data. But since we have classified  both capital  and labor in agriculture as sector
A-6Table A2a: Percent of Value Added  by Labor Type and Sector
Sector  L PROF  L ADMN  LCLER  LRETL  L  SRVC  L AGRC  L  PROD  L OTHR
AGR  1  8
FRS  5  8  1  9
FIS  1  11
COL  9  1  6  3  53
CRU  1  4
MIN  8  1  6  3  50
STO  2  2  1  14
MEA  1  2  1  1  19
CAN  1  2  1  1  19
VEG  1  2  1  1  18
GRN  2  3  2  1  24
SUG  6  8  6  3  75  2
OFP  2  3  2  1  24  1
ALC  2  3  2  1  23  1
BEV  3  4  3  2  37  1
TOB  3  4  3  1  33  1
TXT  1  2  1  1  17
WAP  1  2  1  1  16
LEA  4
SHO  2  2  2  1  21
WOO  1  1  1  9
FRN  1  2  1  1  18
PAP  2  3  2  1  24  1
PRN  2  3  2  1  29  1
FRT  2  4  3  2  34  1
DRG  1  2  1  1  17
OCP  2  2  2  1  20
REF  4
PET  1  2  1  1  19
RBR  2  3  2  1  29  1
PLA  2  2  2  1  20
GLA  2  3  2  1  24
CEM  1  2  1  1  17
NMM  2  3  2  1  25  1
IRO  3  4  3  2  39  1
NFM  1  2  2  1  20
FAB  1  2  1  1  19
MAC  1  2  2  1  20
AGM  2  2  1  1  19
ELM  2  3  2  1  26  1
SHP  3  5  3  2  45  1
RRE  5  7  5  3  66  2
VEH  3  4  3  2  39  1
OTE  3  5  3  2  36  2
OMN  2  3  2  1  27  1
ELE  9  1  13  3  14
GAS  6  1  9  2  10
CON  3  5  2  1  43
TRD  2  3  6  9  2
RES  2  4  10  14  3
TRW  1  2  6
COM  3  2  10  2  35  1
FIN  22  8  29  1  3  2
SRV  28  3  9  9  9  1
Source:  CaLculated  from  De Santis  and Ozhan (1994,  Table  68).
A-7Table A2b: Value Added by Sector and by Capital  Type within Sectors
VaLue  Added  Percent  of Value  Added  by Capital  Type
Sector  Billions  of
Turkish  Lira  %  K RENT  K_AGRC  K  PROD  K_TRAD  K SERV
AGR  60  17  91
FRS  3  1  77
FIS  2  1  88
COL  2  1  28
CRU  1  95
MIN  32
STO  2  1  81
MEA  1  75
CAN  1  75
VEG  1  76
GRN  1  68
OFP  4  1  68
ALC  2  69
BEV  1  51
TOB  3  1  56
TXT  8  2  77
WAP  3  1  78
LEA  1  94
SHO  72
WOO  3  1  88
FRN  1  76
PAP  2  68
PRN  1  61
FRT  1  55
DRG  2  77
OCP  4  1  73
REF  4  1  95
PET  1  75
RBR  1  61
PLA  1  74
GLA  1  68
CEM  2  1  77
NMM  2  66
IRO  3  1  48
NFM  1  73
FAB  4  1  75
KAC  3  1  74
AGM  1  75
ELM  3  1  66
SHP  41
RRE  12
VEH  4  1  49
OTE  50
OMN  1  64
ELE  7  2  59
GAS  2  71
CON  23  7  45
TRD  58  16  77
RES  9  3  66
TRN  47  13  91
COM  4  1  47
FIN  11  3  35
SRV  54  15  21  20
TOTAL  100
Source:  Calculated  from  De Santis  and  Ozhan  (1994,  Table  B8).
A-8specific, the impact on our results of a probably excessive share of value-added  attributed to
capital in agriculture should  be minimal.  For example, an adverse impact  on agricultural  sectors
will induce a reduction in the price of both labor and capital in agriculture, without a shift of
either to  non-agricultural  sectors. We  should, however, be skeptical in  interpreting results
regarding the relative price of labor and capital in the agricultural  sectors.
Although  the SAM identifies  a large number  of households,  distinguished  by income  level
and location  of residence, we choose to aggregate  these into one representative  household. For
the immediate  applications  of the model, such an aggregation  greatly facilitates  understanding
and exposition  of the basic results.
The key tax instruments  are import tariffs and the value added tax. The key subsidy
instruments  are export subsidies  and production  subsidies.  These are all represented  in the model
as fixed  ad valorem  distortions.  One of the challenges  of assembling  our model  was to determine
appropriate  values for these items. The rates we employ are listed in percentage form, on a net
basis, in Table A3.
Import tariffs should provide the least difficulty  in estimation.  Unfortunately,  there are
major discrepancies  between statutory  rates on imports and collected  rates. This discrepancy  is
relatively common  amongst less developed  countries  (see Pritchett  and Sethi [1994]). However,
it is particularly severe in the case of Turkey because of the pervasive  use of complex  transfer
pricing arrangements  for SOE imports, as well as the use of duty drawback  schemes  to provide
investment  and export incentives.
We employ  pre-CU tariff rates  based on 1993  collections  and 1991 import  weights. These
differ considerably from (unweighted)  statutory rates. Our post-CU tariff rates on non-EU
A-9Table A3: Percentage  Tax and Subsidy  Rates in the Base Model (Net Basis)
1993  Post-CU  Import  Tariffs  1993  1990
Import  -------------------------------  Export  1990  Production
Sector  Tariffs  MFN  GSP  Average  subsidy  VAT+ConsTax  Subsidy
AGR  21  21  21  21  3  1  2
FRS  -1  2
FIS  39  39  39  39  5  1
COL  4  2  7  8  3
CRU  17  15
MIN  1  4
STO  3  1  1  1  9  5
MEA  24  24  24  24  13  1
CAN  45  45  45  45  8  3
VEG  4  4  4  4  9  2
GRN  39  39  39  39  5  11
SUG  18  18  18  18  9  15
OFP  52  52  52  52  2  2
ALC  62  11  7  9  6  32  32
BEV  107  15  7  5  37
TOB  81  9  5  11  35  35
TXT  10  21  21  21  8  7
WAP  28  30  30  30  11  4
LEA  2  10  3  7  14  4
SHO  30  23  9  16  9  4
woo  19  2  1  10  2
FRN  22  6  3  5  7
PAP  19  3  1  25  4
PRN  14  5  2  5  28
FRT  1  8  4  24  8
DRG  1  5  3  9  3
OCP  11  9  4  15  2
REF  9  2  1  16  162
PET  4  5  2  29  1  3
RBR  18  6  3  10  1
PLA  24  10  5  5  9
GLA  23  6  3  10  4
CEM  2  3  2  8  3
NMM  18  5  3  9  6
IRO  1  6  3  4  21  9
NFM  4  3  1  2  19  2
FAB  14  6  3  8  4
MAC  6  4  2  8  2
AGM  17  4  2  9  3
ELM  11  8  4  13  16
SHP  3  1  8  2
RRE  5  4  2  1
VEH  27  9  5  7  43
OTE  2  1  14  16
OMN  10  3  1  4  51
ELE  18  1
GAS  1
CON  4
TRD  6  4
RES  6




Sources:  1993  Import  Tariffs  are  based  on  collected  revenues,  estimated  by  the  State  Planning  Organization
(SPO);  Post-CU  Import  Tariffs  are  estimated  by  Togan  C1996J;  1993  Export  Subsidies  are  World  Bank
estimates;  1990 VAT rates  plus consumption  tax rates  are based on collected indirect  tax
revenues,  estimated  by SPO;  1990  Production  Subsidy  rates  are  based  on collections  reported  in
the 10 table.
countries  are based on estimates  from Togan  [1996],  recognizing  differences  between  MFN rates
A-10and GSP rates that Turkey will be required to apply. We take a simple  average  of the GSP and
MFN rates in each sector, reflecting the aggregate  share of each group of countries in Turkish
imports in recent years. Note that agricultural  import tariffs do not change after the CU.
Export subsidies  are notoriously  difficult  to estimate in Turkey, because of the complex
way in which they are implemented  as reductions in other tax obligations.  We employ World
Bank estimates of these rates for 1993 (see Arslan [19951),  although subsequent  government
decisions indicate that these rates will be much lower in 1995.
The VAT rates reported in Table A3 reflect actual collections, using data for 1993
obtained  from the State Planning  Organization  (SPO).  There are several  reasons for these rates
to vary more than one would expect after the CU. Turkey has only employed  a VAT for a few
years, and administrative  problems  in uniformly  implementing  and enforcing  the statutory  rates
cause collection rates to vary across sectors even if statutory rates do not. Some sectors are
easier to audit than others, by the nature  of their activities  (e.g., urban-based  versus rural-based,
large invoiced  transactions  versus  smaller  cash-based  transactions,  more  computerized  accounting
systems versus more traditional accounting systems).
Production  subsidies  are calculated  using data from the 1990 10 table. For tobacco and
alcoholic  beverages we assume a production subsidy  equal to the benchmark  consumption  tax4
applies. We compute these subsidies  as ad valorem rates from the 10 data and transfer these
rates to our SAM, re-balancing  domestic  supply  in each sector so as to ensure zero profits. This
re-balancing  also takes into account our use of data on tariffs, VAT rates and export subsidies
from "outside" the original, balanced SAM.
4 These taxes are embodied  in our benchmark  VAT rates.
A-11Estimates  of elasticities  of substitution  must be assumed  for primary factor substitution,
value added and intermediate input substitution, import demand, detailed import component,
import source, and domestic  demand;  elasticities  of transformation  must also be assumed  for the
allocation  of domestic  supply into domestic  and exported  markets,  the allocation  of exports into
detailed export components,  and the allocation of exports to destination. Despite  our literature
search, there are many elasticities  about which there is considerable  uncertainty.  Our solution
for that problem is to undertake  a systematic  sensitivity  analysis  with respect  to key elasticities.
Harrison and Vinod [1992]  and Harrison, Rutherford,  and Tarr [1993] demonstrate  the role of
systematic sensitivity analysis of  models such as these with respect to plausible ranges of
uncertainty  about key elasticities.
The base model  assumptions  with respect  to key elasticities  are listed in Table A4. These
elasticities refer to:
* The elasticity  of substitution  between capital and labor in each sector, ESUB_KL, for which
we employ point estimates  from Harrison, Rutherford,  and Tarr [19931.
* Elasticities  of substitution  between intermediate  inputs and the value added composite  in each
sector, ESUB_10, assumed to be 0 in all sectors reflecting the Leontief tradition for
intermediate  input substitutability.
* Elasticities of substitution  between domestic production and an imports composite in each
sector, ESUB_DM. In Harrison, Rutherford,  and Tarr [1993] we employed  a common
value of 2 across all sectors. Here we assume  elasticity  values documented  in Harrison,
Jones, Kimbell  and Wigle [1992]  and Harrison, Rutherford  and Wooton [1991].
A-12Table A4: Base Model Elasticities  for Each Sector
Sector  ESUB  KL  ESUBIO  ESUB_DM  ESUB  G  ESUB  MM  ETRN  DX  ETRN  G  ETRN_XX
AGR  0.94  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
FRS  0.94  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
FIS  0.94  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
CFL  0.43  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
CRU  0.43  0.0  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
CRN  0.43  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
STO  0.43  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
MEA  0.94  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
CAN  0.94  0.0  1.10  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
YEG  0.94  0.0  1.70  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
GRN  0.94  0.0  2.10  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
SUG  0.94  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
OFP  0.94  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
ALC  0.94  0.0  2.10  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
BEV  0.94  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
TOB  0.84  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
TXT  0.93  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
WAP  0.93  0.0  3.40  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
LEA  0.75  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
SHO  0.93  0.0  6.80  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
WOO  0.74  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
FRN  0.74  0.0  1.90  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
PAP  1.09  0.0  1.10  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
PRU  1.09  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
FRT  1.01  0.0  1.40  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
FRG  1.01  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
OCP  1.01  0.0  1.80  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
REF  0.29  0.0  0.34  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
PET  0.29  0.0  0.34  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
RBR  0.97  0.0  1.30  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
PLA  0.97  0.0  1.30  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
GLA  0.96  0.0  1.40  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
CEM  0.96  0.0  0.80  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
NMM  0.43  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
IRO  0.91  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
NFM  0.91  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
FAB  0.91  0.0  1.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
MAC  1.20  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
MACM  1.20  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
ELM  0.98  0.0  1.30  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
SHP  1.88  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
RRE  1.88  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
VEH  1.88  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
OTE  1.88  0.0  0.50  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
ONN  1.19  0.0  1.20  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
ELE  1.88  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
GAS  1.88  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
CON  1.99  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
TRO  1.28  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
RES  3.12  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
TRN  1.88  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
CON  1.99  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
FIN  2.05  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
SRV  1.99  0.0  2.00  2.00  5.00  2.90  2.00  5.00
A-13* The elasticity  of substitution  between detailed import components,  ESUB_G,  assumed to be
2.
* The elasticity of  substitution for detailed imports distinguished by  source, ESUB_MM,
assumed to be 5 across all sectors.
* The elasticity of substitution between the domestic consumption of each good, ESUBC,
assumed  to approximately  1.5.
* The elasticity of  transformation of domestic production into domestic uses and export,
ETRN_DX, assumed  to be 2.9 across all sectors following  the estimates  for Turkey by
Faini [1988].
- The elasticity of transformation  between detailed export components, ETRN G, assumed to
be 2.
?  The elasticity of transformation  between regional  destinations,  ETRN_XX,  assumed to be 5
across all sectors.
These elasticity  values reflect our best guesses  based on past experience  and the available  data.
Our sensitivity  analysis  with respect  to these  elasticities  employs  a number  of assumptions
as to their likely  range of variation.  These assumptions  are based  partly on available  econometric
estimates  of standard errors, and largely on a priori judgement. Specifically,  we assume:
* ESUB_KL  is distributed  normally, with a mean equal to the point estimate assumed in the
base model and a standard deviation  from Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr [1993].
* ESUB_10 is distributed  uniformly  between 0 and 0.5 in all sectors.
* ESUB_DM  is distributed  uniformly, with a range equal to the point estimate assumed above
plus or minus 50% of that point estimate.
A-14* ESUB_G is distributed  uniformly between 1 and 3.
* ESUB_MM  is distributed  uniformly  between 4 and 6.
* ESUBC is distributed  uniformly, with a range equal to the point estimate assumed  above plus
or minus 50% of that point estimate.
* ETRN_DX is distributed  normally, with a mean equal to the point estimate assumed in the
base model (2.9) and a standard deviation  of 1.3 from Faini [1988].
* ETRN_G is distributed  uniformly  between 1 and 3.
* ETRN_XX is distributed  uniformly  between 4 and 6.
In all cases we assume that elasticities  generated  by random  perturbation  must be non-negative,
resulting in some truncation  at zero for those generated  assuming  a normal distribution.
Additional  tables of basic data employed  in the model  or calculated  from our benchmark
data are  presented at  the  end of  this appendix. The  SOE model is  generated with  the
GAMS/MPSGE  software developed  by Brooke, Kendrick  and Meeraus [1992] and Rutherford
[1992a][1992b].  It is then solved using the MILES algorithm  developed  by Rutherford [1993].
3. Systematic  Sensitivity  Analysis
To calibrate our model estimates  of elasticities must be assembled for primary factor
substitution,  import  demand, import  source, and domestic  demand,  amongst  the more important
for our purposes. In the base model all elasticity  values are assigned  a priori to values which
we believe are plausible central tendency  estimates. Since elasticity estimates  are subject to a
margin of error, our "remedy" for this problem, which is endemic  to any large-scale  model of
this kind, is to undertake systematic sensitivity  analyses of our major results with respect to
A-15plausible bounds  on these elasticities.  Even if we are unable  to specify  a point estimate with any
precision, our priors over the likely bounds  that these elasticities  could take are quite strong. To
the extent that our major conclusions  are robust to perturbations  over these bounds, we do not
see our uncertainty  over specific  values of these elasticities  as a weakness  of the model. 5
Our sensitivity  analysis  employs  the procedures  developed  by Harrison  and Vinod [19921.
Essentially  these  procedures  amount to a Monte  Carlo simulation  exercise in which  a wide range
of elasticities are  independently  and simultaneously  perturbed from their benchmark values.
These perturbations follow prescribed distributions, such as a t distribution with a specified
standard  deviation  and degrees  of freedom,  or a uniform  distribution  over a specified  range. For
each Monte Carlo run we solve the counter-factual  policy with the selected set of elasticities.
This process is repeated until we arrive at the desired sample  size, in our case 1000. The results
are then tabulated as a distribution, with equal weight being given (by construction)  to each
Monte Carlo run. The upshot is a probability  distribution  defined  over the endogenous  variables
of interest. In our case we focus solely on the welfare impacts  of the FULL CU scenario.
TIhe  sensitivity  analysis we undertake reflects a diffuse set of priors over the plausible
elasticity  values. The specific  assumptions  made  are set out in an appendix. If we find that these
5 These rmarlks should not be interpreted  as denying  the value of any new empirical  work on generating  such
elasticities. On the contrary, any effort that could generate better bounds on these point estimates is useful in
generating  policy conclusions  that carry greater credibility,  even if those conclusions  will still be probabilistic  in
nature. Moreover, we do not consider sensitivity  analysis with respect to more general functional  forms, even
though  we share concerns with the restrictiveness  of some of the popular  forms we employ.
A-16wide ranges result in fragile inferences  about welfare or revenue effects, then the next step
would be to employ data-based  priors about plausible  ranges. 6
The results for the FULL scenario, in which the VAT is used as a replacement  tax, are
reported in Table A5 after 5000 Monte Carlo runs. The variables reported, apart from the
percent welfare effect and summary  variables for the tax change  and exchange  rate, include  the
percentage change in value added in each sector.
These results indicate  that the overall conclusions  we have drawn are not fragile to the
assumptions made about underlying elasticities, although some of the sectoral impacts are.
Welfare impacts range from 0.8% up to 1.2%, and the change in the replacement  tax ranges
from 13  % up to 20%. These do not appear to be large variations,  relative to the main theme of
our analysis. Given that there is some  variation in the individual  sectoral impacts,  and relatively
little variation in the overall welfare  or revenue impacts,  these results also indicate  some  caution
in using a  model such as this one to predict specific "winners" and  "losers". Despite this
uncertainty,  the basic conclusions  as to welfare and revenue effects are robust.
6  This data-based  method was employed,  for example, in Harrison, Rutherford  and Tarr  [1993]. Harrison,
Jones, Kimbell  and Wigle [19931  advocated  it as a means of minimizin the chance  of overly fragile  results from
such sensidvity  analyses.
A-17Table  AS: Results of Sensitivity Analysis
Measure  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Miniunu  Maximun  Cases
W AGG  2614.3  201.12  -0.023  2.165  2070.  3132.  5000
W AGGX  0.99720  0.81814E-01  -0.021  2.209  0.8000  1.200  5000
TAUX  115.38  0.69745  0.245  3.407  113.3  120.3  5000
PFX%  -0.95140E-01  0.36141  0.299  3.132  -1.300  1.700  5000
AGR  0.10340  0.33417E-01  0.605  8.740  0.0000  0.2000  5000
FRS  -1.4767  0.40126  -0.190  2.876  -3.100  -0.2000  5000
FIS  0.87138  0.25102  -4.201 43.360  -3.200  1.500  5000
COL  0.96494  0.38366  0.106  3.395  -1.100  2.400  5000
CRU  -0.24440E-01 0.16025  -0.511  3.715  -0.9000  0.5000  5000
MIN  2.2560  1.5492  0.211  2.994  -2.200  8.200  5000
STO  -0.79240E-01 0.75034E-01  -0.260  3.257  -0.4000  0.2000  5000
MEA  2.1384  0.65966  -0.007  2.917 -0.2000  4.500  5000
CAN  23.163  11.941  1.058  6.875  -0.6000  142.6  5000
VEG  3.2869  1.0868  0.493  3.361  0.5000  8.600  5000
GRN  1.7521  0.46402  -0.340  7.714  -3.500  3.400  5000
SUG  0.40598  0.55279  -0.243  4.052  -4.400  2.200  5000
OFP  2.3623  0.60378  0.372  3.436  -1.100  4.800  5000
ALC  -9.4629  3.9955  -0.242  1.934  -18.60  -2.200  5000
BEV  -4.4299  2.7239  -0.377  2.022  -10.90  0.5000  5000
TOB  -33.654  10.943  0.248  2.845  -52.50  45.40  5000
TXT  1.8865  1.2233  0.074  2.854  -2.000  6.100  5000
WAP  9.8477  6.2739  0.003  2.871  -7.900  36.30  5000
LEA  2.5946  2.8435  0.077  2.921  -6.200  14.90  5000
SHO  -0.88300  0.82398  -0.079  2.124  -2.800  1.400  5000
WOO  -0.30728  0.36078  -0.057  2.490  -2.100  0.7000  5000
FRN  -0.45072  0.40409  -0.179  2.508  -3.200  0.5000  5000
PAP  -3.9090  1.2668  0.038  2.288  -7.100  0.8000  5000
PRN  -0.84486  0.55648  -0.048  2.479  -3.300  0.6000  5000
FRT  2.1185  0.83111  0.248  2.912  -0.3000  5.200  5000
DRG  1.9487  0.58888  0.230  5.249  -3.400  5.000  5000
OCP  -5.3812  2.0774  -0.004  2.166  -10.60  4.000  5000
REF  -2.1000  0.75504  -0.316  3.672  -8.400  -0.2000  5000
PET  1.1451  0.35965  -0.529  8.252  -3.000  2.400  5000
RBR  -1.3091  0.92979  -0.084  2.216  -3.900  1.200  5000
PLA  -2.3164  1.2241  0.212  3.034  -5.400  5.400  5000
GLA  -2.9574  1.2523  -0.055  2.374  -7.100  1.200  5000
CEM  0.16964  0.13782  0.481  3.391 -0.2000  0.8000  5000
NMM  -4.6632  1.6472  -0.095  1.904  -8.400  -1.300  5000
IRO  2.9949  2.1176  0.166  2.876  -2.500  10.60  5000
NFM  -2.8915  0.70456  0.023  2.997  -5.300  0.0000  5000
FAB  -2.3216  0.85136  -0.070  2.103  -4.500  0.1000  5000
MAC  -0.51118  0.48827  0.086  2.815  -1.900  1.400  5000
AGN  -0.35402  0.26375  -0.049  2.497  -1.300  0.4000  5000
ELM  -5.3718  1.4792  -0.026  2.108  -9.400  -1.700  5000
SHP  4.5309  2.2082  0.629  3.618 -0.4000  15.40  5000
RRE  0.39572  0.17126  -0.023  3.093 -0.5000  1.000  5000
VEH  -15.763  4.5986  0.019  1.861  -25.00  -2.600  5000
OTE  -0.80694  0.38975  -0.283  3.113  -2.600  0.5000  5000
OMN  -3.7645  1.2664  -0.066  2.230  -7.100  0.0000  5000
ELE  -0.24380E-01  0.19959  0.159  2.997  -0.7000  0.8000  5000
GAS  0.70026  0.10229  -0.896  9.405  -0.3000  1.000  5000
CON  0.21296  0.53559E-01 -0.178  5.199  -0.2000  0.4000  5000
TRD  1.1038  0.23436  -1.054 11.169  -1.600  2.100  5000
RES  2.2249  0.67432  0.405  3.273  -0.4000  5.100  5000
TRN  0.66956  0.12665  0.031  3.946  -0.1000  1.100  5000
COM  0.38418  0.25133  -5.723 97.936  -5.700  0.9000  5000
FIN  0.25342  0.10693  -0.217  3.741  -0.3000  0.6000  5000
SRV  0.51508  0.12464  -2.665 35.120  -1.700  0.9000  5000
A-18TABLE  A6: THE COST  STRUCTURE  OF DOMESTIC  PRODUCTION
OUTPUT  :  TOTAL  PRODUCTION  --  BILLIONS OF TL (1990)
INTERM  :  INTERMEDIATE  INPUTS --  BILLIONS OF TL  (1990)
LABOR  TOTAL  PAYMENTS  --  BILLIONS OF TL (1990)
CAPITAL  TOTAL  PAYMENTS  --  BILLIONS OF TL (1990)
K/L  RATIO OF CAPITAL EARNINGS  TO LABOR  EARNINGS
K/VA  RATIO  OF CAPITAL PAYMENTS  TO VALUE  ADDED  -- X
VA/GDP  RATIO  OF VALUE  ADDED  TO ECONOMY-WIDE  GDP  --  X
OUTPUT  INTERM  LABOR  CAPITAL  K/L  K/VA  VA/GDP
AGR  89.0  30.0  5.8  55.1  9.5  90.5  16.9
FRS  3.4  0.5  0.7  2.3  3.4  77.3  0.8
FIS  2.6  0.5  0.2  1.9  7.7  88.5  0.6
COL  2.8  0.8  1.5  0.6  0.4  27.7  0.5
CRU  1.9  0.3  0.1  1.5  18.5  94.9  0.4
MIN  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.5  31.6  0.0
STO  3.1  0.6  0.5  2.0  4.3  81.0  0.7
MEA  3.3  2.6  0.2  0.5  3.0  75.3  0.2
CAN  2.1  1.5  0.2  0.5  3.0  75.1  0.2
VEG  4.0  2.9  0.3  0.8  3.2  76.3  0.3
GRN  6.1  5.2  0.3  0.6  2.2  68.5  0.2
SUG  2.8  2.7  0.5  0.1
OFP  17.9  13.6  1.4  2.9  2.1  67.9  1.2
ALC  2.8  0.7  0.7  1.4  2.2  68.9  0.4
BEV  1.5  0.7  0.4  0.4  1.0  50.8  0.2
TOB  5.9  2.5  1.5  1.9  1.2  55.5  0.7
TXT  27.6  18.6  2.1  6.9  3.4  77.1  2.4
WAP  10.6  7.5  0.7  2.5  3.6  78.4  0.8
LEA  2.4  1.5  0.1  0.8  15.6  94.0  0.2
SHO  1.7  1.2  0.1  0.3  2.6  72.3  0.1
WOO  8.2  5.3  0.4  2.6  7.3  87.9  0.8
FRN  2.3  1.6  0.2  0.5  3.2  75.9  0.2
PAP  5.0  3.3  0.5  1.1  2.1  67.8  0.5
PRN  3.3  2.1  0.5  0.7  1.6  61.5  0.3
FRT  2.0  1.5  0.3  0.3  1.2  55.1  0.1
DRG  3.8  2.1  0.4  1.3  3.3  76.8  0.4
OCP  12.6  8.0  1.2  3.3  2.7  72.9  1.3
REF  22.5  11.0  0.6  10.9  19.6  95.1  1.2
PET  2.1  1.6  0.2  0.5  3.0  74.7  0.2
RBR  4.9  3.5  0.6  0.9  1.6  61.0  0.4
PLA  2.8  2.0  0.2  0.6  2.8  73.9  0.2
GLA  2.3  1.1  0.4  0.9  2.1  67.7  0.3
CEM  4.7  2.2  0.6  1.9  3.4  77.4  0.7
NMM  3.7  1.8  0.6  1.2  1.9  66.1  0.5
IRO  16.1  12.8  1.7  1.6  0.9  48.1  0.8
NFM  4.8  3.2  0.4  1.1  2.8  73.4  0.4
FAB  9.6  5.9  1.0  2.8  3.0  74.9  1.0
MAC  7.5  4.3  0.8  2.3  2.8  73.8  0.9
AGM  1.9  1.3  0.2  0.5  3.0  75.2  0.2
ELM  9.5  5.8  1.3  2.4  1.9  65.7  0.9
SHP  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.7  41.0  0.1
RRE  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  11.9  0.0
VEH  12.5  7.3  2.6  2.5  1.0  48.8  1.0
OTE  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  50.0  0.0
OMN  5.4  3.5  0.7  1.2  1.8  64.4  0.4
ELE  10.7  2.9  3.2  4.7  1.5  59.2  1.9
GAS  2.4  0.8  0.5  1.2  2.5  71.3  0.5
CON  57.0  32.7  13.4  10.9  0.8  44.9  6.5
TRD  72.8  15.0  13.9  47.2  3.4  77.3  16.1
RES  21.2  11.2  3.4  6.6  1.9  65.8  2.6
TRN  76.1  28.6  4.5  43.8  9.8  90.7  13.3
COM  6.8  1.9  2.6  2.3  0.9  47.1  1.1
FIN  16.1  3.1  8.5  4.5  0.5  34.7  3.1
SRV  67.0  9.6  33.6  23.7  0.7  41.3  15.1
A-19TABLE  A7: PRODUCTION  AND TRADE
OUTPUT  TOTAL  PRODUCTION  --  BILLIONS  OF TL (1990)
DOMEST  PRODUCTION  FOR  DOMESTIC  MARKET  --  BILLIONS  OF TL (1990)
EXPORT  PRODUCTION  FOR  EXPORT  MARKETS  --  BILLIONS  OF TL (1990)
IMPORT  TOTAL  VALUE  OF IMPORTS  --  BILLIONS  OF TL (1990)
M/(M+D) :  IMPORT  SHARE  OF DOMESTIC  DEMAND  --  X
X/(X+D) :  EXPORT  SHARE  OF DOMESTIC  OUTPUT  --  %
OUTPUT  DONEST  EXPORT  IMPORT  M/(M+D)  X/(X+D)
AGR  89.0  86.5  2.5  2.6  2.9  2.8
FRS  3.4  3.4  0.0  0.5  12.4  0.8
FIS  2.6  2.5  0.1  0.0  0.5  3.7
COL  2.8  2.8  0.0  0.8  23.1  0.0
CRU  1.9  1.9  0.0  9.9  84.3  0.3
MIN  0.2  0.2  0.2  51.9
STO  3.1  2.5  0.6  0.3  10.9  18.0
MEA  3.3  3.0  0.3  0.5  15.0  8.9
CAN  2.1  0.5  1.6  0.1  10.1  76.5
VEG  4.0  3.5  0.5  0.8  19.0  12.0
GRN  6.1  5.9  0.2  0.2  3.5  2.9
SUG  2.8  2.8  0.0  0.9  23.7  0.3
OFP  17.9  15.6  2.3  0.8  4.8  12.7
ALC  2.8  2.4  0.3  0.2  6.5  12.1
BEV  1.5  1.4  0.1  0.0  2.6  7.0
TOB  5.9  5.8  0.1  1.9  24.6  2.1
TXT  27.6  20.9  6.7  2.4  10.4  24.3
WAP  10.6  5.3  5.3  0.6  10.0  50.2
LEA  2.4  1.9  0.5  0.5  20.7  19.0
SHO  1.7  1.6  0.1  0.1  4.0  5.7
WOO  8.2  8.1  0.1  0.2  2.0  0.9
FRN  2.3  2.2  0.1  0.1  2.4  2.7
PAP  5.0  4.8  0.1  1.0  17.5  3.0
PRN  3.3  3.2  0.1  0.1  3.9  1.6
FRT  2.0  1.8  0.2  0.8  30.1  10.1
DRG  3.8  3.6  0.2  0.9  20.0  4.8
OCP  12.6  11.2  1.4  8.8  44.2  11.5
REF  22.5  21.6  0.9  3.4  13.7  3.9
PET  2.1  2.1  0.0  0.2  10.1  0.9
RBR  4.9  4.8  0.2  0.6  11.5  3.5
PLA  2.8  2.7  0.1  0.4  12.2  4.3
GLA  2.3  1.9  0.5  0.2  11.6  19.4
CEM  4.7  4.5  0.2  0.1  2.8  3.6
NMM  3.7  3.5  0.2  0.6  14.5  6.1
IRO  16.1  12.8  3.3  4.9  27.6  20.7
NFM  4.8  4.1  0.7  5.4  57.1  14.0
FAB  9.6  9.2  0.4  1.4  13.3  4.4
MAC  7.5  7.0  0.4  10.6  60.2  6.0
AGM  1.9  1.9  0.0  0.2  8.0  1.3
ELM  9.5  8.5  0.9  5.6  39.8  9.9
SHP  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.6  63.0  29.3
RRE  0.3  0.3  0.1  17.5
VEH  12.5  12.0  0.5  5.4  31.1  3.8
OTE  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.9  89.7  4.3
ONN  5.4  5.1  0.4  2.5  32.9  7.0
ELE  10.7  10.6  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.8
GAS  2.4  2.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2
CON  57.0  57.0
TRD  72.8  67.4  5.4  7.4
RES  21.2  17.6  3.5  1.2  6.5  16.7
TRN  76.1  63.6  12.5  2.1  3.2  16.4
CON  6.8  6.8  0.1  0.1  1.1  0.9
FIN  16.1  16.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.8
SRV  67.0  65.8  1.1  0.7  1.0  1.7
A-20TABLE  A8: IMPORTS  VOLUMES,  SHARES  AND RATES  OF  PROTECTION
IMPORT  TOTAL  IMPORTS  --  BILLIONS OF TL (1990)
M(I)/M  COMMCDITY  IMPORT  SHARE  --  X
MEU/M(I)  EU IMPORT  SHARE  --  %
EU TAR  TARIFF  RATE  ON EU IMPORTS  --  %
EFTA  TAR  TARIFF  RATE  ON EFTA  IMPORTS  --  %
ROW TAR  TARIFF  RATE  ON REST  OF WORLD  IMPORTS  --  %
IMPORT  M(I)/M  MSHR_EU  EU_TAR  EFTA-TAR  ROW TAR
AGR  2.1  2.8  25.0  15.7  18.1  23.1
FRS  0.5  0.6  16.5  0.3  0.3  0.5
FIS  0.0  0.0  30.5  37.6  37.6  40.2
COL  0.8  1.1  0.3  0.2  0.4
CRU  9.9  13.2  0.0  0.0  0.0
MIN  0.2  0.3  0.6
STO  0.3  0.4  32.2  4.2  3.0  1.9
MEA  0.4  0.6  35.8  27.7  27.7  22.6
CAN  0.0  0.1  47.3  40.4  40.4  48.2
VEG  0.8  1.0  7.7  4.1  4.1  3.7
GRN  0.2  0.2  3.6  36.5  38.7
SUG  0.7  1.0  93.5  18.4  18.4  18.2
OFP  0.5  0.7  75.5  51.7  51.7  53.1
ALC  0.1  0.1  81.4  63.8  51.5
BEV  0.0  0.0  66.7  103.3  114.3
TOB  1.1  1.4  3.5  20.3  20.3  82.7
TXT  2.2  2.9  26.6  11.6  10.5  8.9
WAP  0.5  0.6  70.2  26.0  26.0  32.7
LEA  0.5  0.7  68.6  1.7  1.7  2.3
SHO  0.0  0.1  25.7  24.4  32.2
WOO  0.1  0.2  41.6  17.9  17.9  19.4
FRN  0.0  0.1  87.9  22.1  22.1  25.0
PAP  0.9  1.1  35.2  17.7  17.7  19.1
PRN  0.1  0.2  72.9  12.7  12.7  17.1
FRT  0.8  1.0  8.7  0.5  0.5  0.8
DRG  0.9  1.2  59.6  1.1  1.1  1.2
OCP  8.0  10.6  63.0  9.8  9.8  11.8
REF  3.1  4.2  63.5  8.3  8.3  9.2
PET  0.2  0.3  24.8  4.9  4.4  3.7
RBR  0.5  0.7  64.1  16.6  16.6  20.0
PLA  0.3  0.4  75.1  22.9  22.9  28.9
GLA  0.2  0.3  64.1  21.4  21.4  27.2
CEM  0.1  0.2  13.6  1.9  2.2
NMM  0.5  0.7  71.4  17.5  17.5  20.1
IRO  4.8  6.4  48.9  1.3  1.3  1.5
NFM  5.3  7.0  38.4  3.7  3.7  3.4
FAB  1.2  1.7  77.4  13.3  13.3  17.6
MAC  10.1  13.3  62.4  5.2  5.2  6.4
AGM  0.1  0.2  78.7  15.7  15.7  21.1
ELM  5.1  6.8  55.7  9.4  9.4  12.7
SHP  0.6  0.7  21.4  2.3  2.3  3.1
RRE  0.1  0.1  10.8  4.7  4.7  5.3
VEH  4.2  5.6  53.0  24.4  24.4  30.9
OTE  0.9  1.2  31.2  0.3  0.6
OMN  2.3  3.0  56.7  8.3  8.3  12.4
ELE  0.0  0.0  43.90814
GAS  0.0  0.0  43.90814
CON
TRD
RES  1.2  1.6  43.90814
TRN  2.1  2.8  43.90814
COM  0.1  0.1  43.90814
FIN  0.0  0.0  43.90814
SRV  0.7  0.9  43.90814
A-21TABLE  A9: EXPORT  VOLUMES,  SHARES  AND RATES  OF SUBSIDY
EXPORT  TOTAL  EXPORTS  --  BILLIONS  OF TL (1990)
E(I)/E  COMMODITY  EXPORT  SHARE  --  %
XS E  EXPORT  SUBSIDY  RATE  -- %
XSHR_EU  EU SHARE  OF TOTAL  EXPORT  DEMAND  -- %
EXPORT  E(I)/E  XS_E  XSHR_EU
AGR  2.4  4.6  3.2  21.7
FRS  0.0  0.0  -0.8  56.1
FIS  0.1  0.2  4.9  82.7
COL  0.0  0.0  6.6  47.5
CRU  0.0  0.0  17.0  50.0
MIN
STO  0.5  1.0  9.2  43.8
MEA  0.3  0.5  12.6  52.9
CAN  1.5  2.8  8.4  66.0
VEG  0.4  0.8  8.7  5.1
GRN  0.2  0.3  5.4  4.6
SUG  0.0  0.0  0.2  10.1
OFP  2.2  4.3  2.2  60.4
ALC  0.3  0.6  5.6  42.0
BEV  0.1  0.2  4.6  12.3
TOB  0.1  0.2  11.3  28.5
TXT  6.2  11.9  8.0  69.3
WAP  4.8  9.2  11.0  71.8
LEA  0.4  0.8  13.5  46.4
SHO  0.1  0.2  8.9  17.6
WOO  0.1  0.1  9.9  23.0
FRN  0.1  0.1  5.0  24.1
PAP  0.1  0.2  24.9  22.2
PRN  0.0  0.1  4.6  44.5
FRT  0.2  0.3  24.1  36.4
DRG  0.2  0.3  9.1  9.2
OCP  1.3  2.4  14.8  30.5
REF  0.7  1.4  16.0  41.5
PET  0.0  0.0  28.8  69.0
RBR  0.2  0.3  9.5  30.0
PLA  0.1  0.2  4.9  37.1
GLA  0.4  0.8  10.2  46.1
CEM  0.2  0.3  8.3  34.2
NMM  0.2  0.4  9.0  56.3
IRO  2.7  5.3  21.0  3.6
NFM  0.6  1.1  19.3  34.7
FAB  0.4  0.8  8.0  40.9
MAC  0.4  0.8  8.2  32.0
AGM  0.0  0.0  8.8  37.1
ELM  0.8  1.6  13.2  60.4
SHP  0.1  0.2  7.6  24.7
RRE
VEH  0.4  0.8  6.7  42.3
OTE  0.0  0.0  13.9  60.0
OMN  0.4  0.7  4.2  48.0
ELE  0.1  0.2  47.5
GAS  0.0  0.1  47.5
CON
TRD  5.4  10.4  47.5
RES  3.5  6.8  47.5
TRN  12.5  24.0  47.5
CON  0.1  0.1  47.5
FIN  0.1  0.2  47.5
SRV  1.1  2.2  47.5
A-22TABLE  AI0:  THE COMPOSITION  OF DOMESTIC  DEMAND
DOMEST :  DOMESTIC  SUPPLY  TO DOMESTIC  MARKET  --  BILLIONS  OF TL (1990)
IMPORT :  IMPORT  SUPPLY  TO  DOMESTIC  MARKET  --  BILLIONS  OF  TL (1990)
INTERMX  :  INTERMEDIATE  DEMAND  --  X OF TOTAL
D HOUSEX:  DOMESTIC  HOUSEHOLD  DEMAND  --  %  OF TOTAL
D GOVTX  GOVERNMENT  DENAND  --  % OF TOTAL
INVESTX  INVESTMENT  DEMAND  --  X OF TOTAL
STOCKX  STOCK  CHANGE  --  X OF TOTAL
DOMEST  IMPORT  INTERM%  D HOUSE%  D_GOVTX  INVEST%  STOCK%
AGR  86.5  2.6  41.3  56.5  0.4  1.9  1.8
FRS  3.4  0.5  78.3  25.9  4.7  -8.9  -8.9
FIS  2.5  0.0  9.4  90.9  -0.3  -0.3
COL  2.8  0.8  58.5  32.1  8.0  1.4  1.4
CRU  1.9  9.9  95.1  4.9  4.9
MIN  0.2  0.2  102.7  -2.7  -2.7
STO  2.5  0.3  72.4  27.6  27.6
MEA  3.0  0.5  31.2  52.0  15.9  0.9  0.9
CAN  0.5  0.1  44.1  39.7  18.1  -1.9  -1.9
VEG  3.5  0.8  44.4  61.5  1.2  -7.1  -7.1
GRN  5.9  0.2  52.5  56.3  1.0  -9.8  -9.8
SUG  2.8  0.9  30.5  59.1  1.2  9.3  9.3
OFP  15.6  0.8  30.4  65.0  1.8  2.7  2.7
ALC  2.4  0.2  22.5  58.1  19.4  19.4
BEV  1.4  0.0  32.5  46.2  0.5  20.8  20.8
TOB  5.8  1.9  1.1  85.1  13.8  13.8
TXT  20.9  2.4  56.6  41.4  0.3  1.7  1.3
WAP  5.3  0.6  3.0  89.8  6.9  0.3  0.1
LEA  1.9  0.5  78.6  13.5  0.0  7.9  7.9
SHO  1.6  0.1  5.7  73.2  10.7  10.4  10.4
Woo  8.1  0.2  74.0  27.8  0.2  -2.0  -2.0
FRN  2.2  0.1  39.2  48.0  12.8  0.8
PAP  4.8  1.0  79.6  15.7  2.3  2.4  2.4
PRN  3.2  0.1  24.1  71.0  0.9  4.1  4.1
FRT  1.8  0.8  100.2  -0.2  -0.2
DRG  3.6  0.9  34.8  63.7  1.6  -0.2  -0.2
OCP  11.2  8.8  60.8  40.1  0.5  -1.4  -1.4
REF  21.6  3.4  88.5  21.8  5.5  -15.8  -15.8
PET  2.1  0.2  91.2  31.3  5.3  -27.8  -27.8
RBR  4.8  0.6  65.3  34.6  0.7  -0.5  -0.5
PLA  2.7  0.4  58.0  41.4  0.3  0.3  0.3
GLA  1.9  0.2  45.6  55.4  1.7  -2.7  -2.7
CEM  4.5  0.1  100.2  0.6  -0.8  -0.8
NMM  3.5  0.6  94.2  14.0  1.0  -9.3  -9.3
IRO  12.8  4.9  98.3  0.1  1.6  1.6
NFM  4.1  5.4  84.0  0.0  16.0  16.0
FAB  9.2  1.4  36.7  50.0  0.7  12.6  3.1
MAC  7.0  10.6  14.6  19.2  3.3  62.9  2.1
AGN  1.9  0.2  31.5  68.5  10.7
ELM  8.5  5.6  39.5  27.3  1.4  31.7  9.1
SHP  0.3  0.6  28.9  71.1  9.5
RRE  0.3  0.1  30.3  69.7  -33.9
VEH  12.0  5.4  37.2  21.3  0.2  41.3  10.1
OTE  0.1  0.9  9.3  90.7  -2.6
OMN  5.1  2.5  12.6  58.2  1.3  27.9  4.8
ELE  10.6  0.0  73.8  12.0  3.8  10.4  10.4
GAS  2.4  0.0  51.7  33.9  14.2  0.2  0.2
CON  57.0  0.4  99.6  -0.9
TRD  67.4  38.6  47.7  1.6  12.1  3.7
RES  17.6  1.2  7.4  90.3  1.5  0.8  0.8
TRN  63.6  2.1  38.6  54.7  1.7  5.0  2.6
COM  6.8  0.1  53.1  31.2  6.6  9.1  9.1
FIN  16.0  0.0  84.2  3.0  4.0  8.8  8.8
SRV  65.8  0.7  20.4  33.2  49.6  -3.2  -3.2
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